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FROM COUNTER-TERRORISM TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
TRANSFORMATION OR BUSINESS AS USUAL? 
 
MIKE TOMLINSON 
 
Professor of Social Policy, Queen’s University Belfast 
 
 
Abstract: 
The article explores the extent to which criminal justice in Northern Ireland 
has been reconstructed over the past fifteen years. The focus is on the 
framework provided in the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the range of 
transition processes that followed. Post-Agreement Inquiries are reviewed 
and the findings demonstrate the institutional rigidities facing the 
transformation of criminal justice. While the ideologies and practices of 
counter-terrorism no longer dominate the business of criminal justice, the 
extent of change in terms of social representativeness, scale and expenditure 
is variable, with the prison service proving the least changed. 
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Introduction 
Counter-terrorism as Industry 
Until the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the business of criminal justice in 
Northern Ireland was dominated by containing and countering violent political 
conflict. Vast resources were committed to this objective and a huge ‘war 
economy’ created. Policing, imprisonment and the courts were an integral part of 
this expansive security industry and have therefore faced major challenges during 
the transition to peace. 
 
The purpose of this article is to review progress on the reconstruction of 
Northern Ireland’s criminal justice institutions in the period following the 
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Agreement, with a particular focus on barriers to change, the resourcing of 
change and the issue of social representation. 
 
 International experience demonstrates that if protracted conflicts are 
not to be repeated, complex and long-term processes of transformation are 
required across many spheres, including substantial reductions in conflict-
related industries and investment in social reconstruction (Collier et al. 2003; 
World Bank 2011). Human rights abuses, before and during cycles of conflict, 
are key sources of dispute and often dominate the politics of peace 
processes. In the case of Northern Ireland, such ‘legacy’ issues have 
received considerable attention within the paradigm of ‘transitional justice’ 
(e.g. Ní Aoláin 2002; Bell 2003; Campbell 2010). Policing has been at the 
heart of most of the significant legal and political disputes in the criminal 
justice field and to some extent remains so (O’Rawe 2003; Committee on the 
Administration of Justice 2011). 
 
There have been three main criticisms of the transitional justice 
paradigm. According to McEvoy (2007: 425), it has been dominated by 
lawyers and forms of legalism that ‘disconnect individuals and communities 
from any sense of sovereignty’ over the issues involved. Secondly, Brewer 
(2010: 37, 206-7) criticizes the ‘good governance’ approach to peace – 
comprising ‘democratic political institutions, market economies and human 
rights law’ – for ignoring the importance of ‘sociological issues that are 
equally critical to the success of the transition process'. The restoration of 
social bonds through ‘hoping, forgiving, apologising, remembrance’, truth 
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recovery and healing, is essential in strengthening fragile peace processes. A 
third criticism invokes a broader notion of sociological concerns, focusing on 
the social needs and interests of those communities most affected by violent 
conflict. As Greiff and Duthie (2009) argue, the transitional justice approach 
tends to ignore the claims of social justice arising from the economic roots 
and consequences of conflict. Post-conflict economic development is often 
based on policies of economic liberalisation to the detriment of equality, social 
inclusion and cohesion (Hillyard et al. 2005; Oslen et al. 2010). In the 
Northern Ireland case, the question of resourcing transition has become more 
acute in the wake of austerity state budgeting and the devolution of justice 
achieved in April 2010 (Tomlinson and Kelly 2011). 
 
The analysis below is informed by Christie’s (1993) perspective on 
‘crime control as industry’. As with crime, a specialist global counter-terrorism 
industry has developed based on similar imperatives of social and political 
polarisation. Counter-terrorism is propelled by ‘an urge for expansion (which) 
is built into industrial thinking’ (1993: 13). It has also become ‘normalised’ in 
law, with attendant social and political effects (Sim and Thomas 1983; 
Hillyard 1993; Mathiesen 2002). For the Northern Ireland conflict, the early 
1990s may be regarded as the ‘high-point’ of criminal-justice-as-counter-
terrorism in terms of the scale of resources involved, and a low-point in terms 
of legitimacy. There was little agreement at Westminster on the causes of 
conflict, how to police it effectively and how to move forward politically, 
especially on the sensitive issue of talking to terrorists.1  
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In the quest for the total elimination of terrorism the Government had 
almost doubled Northern Ireland’s security expenditure (in real terms) in the 
ten years from 1984, adopting a ‘blank cheque’ mentality to the war on 
terrorism. Few had ever considered the costs of the conflict in financial terms 
or analysed the impact on the economy and labour market. According to Tony 
Benn, however, ‘the cost of the war has been £14.5 billion’ (HC Debate 1993, 
230, col. 515). Arguably, a more realistic total was £23.5 billion, with annual 
costs running to £2.3 billion by 1993/4, and 42 per cent of the costs arising in 
Britain and the Republic of Ireland (Tomlinson, 1994: 25-32). More 
conventionally stated, public spending on Law, Order and Protective Services 
amounted to about 11 per cent of the public spending attributable to Northern 
Ireland at this time. 
 
By the early 1990s, more than 38,000 people were directly employed 
in policing, running the prisons and in the Ulster Defence Regiment. This was 
a segregated labour force – mainly male and Protestant – in a heavily 
segmented Northern Irish labour market (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988). The 
prospect of armed republicanism leaving the stage as part of a peace process 
represented a huge threat to the security industry. This is why the leader of 
the Ulster Unionist Party, Jim Molyneaux, saw the IRA’s 1994 ceasefire as 
‘destabilising’ and the worst thing that had ever happened to unionists 
(McKittrick 1999). There were good reasons not to trust the old enemy, to 
seek out opportunities to re-create it, and to resist the potential transformation 
of Northern Ireland’s criminal justice agencies. 
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Criminal Justice in Transition 
The 1998 Agreement provided the broad template for the 
reconstruction of criminal justice in the context of new constitutional 
relationships between Northern Ireland, Great Britain and the Republic of 
Ireland. The notion of ‘national security’, used to justify so many areas of 
counter-terrorist policy and practice in the past, now appeared at odds with 
the recognition of both British and Irish identities. By incorporating the 
principle of the right to self-determination of the people on the island of 
Ireland to bring about a united Ireland, the 1998 Agreement set in train a 
whole series of transformative possibilities in how justice is done and seen to 
be done in Northern Ireland, and to a lesser extent in the Republic (Vaughan 
and Kilcommins 2008).  
 
The Agreement signalled root and branch reform of policing, the 
prosecution process, and judicial appointments, emphasising human rights 
and accountability within criminal justice agencies. Underlying the transition 
from war to peace was the emphasis on demilitarisation. This meant the 
decommissioning of weapons and explosives belonging to the armed groups 
as well as the ‘normalisation of security arrangements and practices’ (Good 
Friday Agreement 1998: para. 8.1). An Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning was established (August 1997) under 
parallel Irish and UK legislation, and parties to the Agreement pledged ‘to use 
any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all 
paramilitary arms within two years’ (Good Friday Agreement 1998: para. 7.3).  
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A further requirement of successful transition was to address 
‘Reconciliation and Victims of Violence’. The Agreement anticipated the 
report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commission set up in October 1997 to 
explore ways ‘to recognise the pain and suffering felt by victims of violence … 
including those who have died or been injured in the service of the 
community’ (Bloomfield Report 1998: 8). While the Commission’s work mainly 
focused on the psychological needs of victims, it also made 
recommendations on how reconciliation between the communities might be 
achieved. The demands for ‘truth and justice’ in relation to state killings and 
collusion between intelligence agencies, security forces and Loyalist armed 
groups was mentioned briefly, but no recommendation was made as to 
whether or how this issue should be addressed (Bell 2003: 1103).  
 
 
In 2001, the Irish and British Governments appointed Peter Cory, a 
retired Canadian Supreme Court Judge, to look at six cases in which 
allegations of collusion had become major political issues affecting the 
implementation of the Agreement and confidence in the peace process as a 
whole. Of particular concern to Unionists was alleged collusion between the 
IRA and An Garda Síochána over two incidents in the border area in the late 
1980s. One case involved the killing of two Royal Ulster Constabulary officers 
(Breen and Buchanan) while the other concerned Lord Justice Gibson and his 
wife. In the Gibson case Cory found there was no basis for recommending a 
public inquiry but in the Breen/Buchanan case, there was ‘evidence capable 
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of constituting collusion’ (Cory 2003b: para. 2.168).  The Irish Government 
therefore established the Smithwick Tribunal (2005) which began public 
hearings in June 2011. Cory recommended four other inquiries into collusion 
– over the killings of Rosemary Nelson, Pat Finucane, Billy Wright and Robert 
Hamill. 2  Taken together, the cases raised fundamental issues about the 
nature and operation of a criminal justice system driven by counter-terrorist 
objectives within a politically polarised society. 
  
The killing of Billy Wright involved allegations of collusion by prison 
authorities, given that he was murdered in H Block 6 of the Maze Prison. In 
recommending a public inquiry, Cory (2004c) identified nine potentially collusive acts 
by the prison authorities, which together merited a public inquiry. The Inquiry report 
was highly critical of a range of agencies: the Prison Service, the Northern Ireland 
Office, the Ministry of Defence, the RUC and its successor, the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI), and the Security Service (MI5). The criticisms referred in 
particular to poor management, from the Chief Executive downwards, poor record 
keeping, the failure to produce documentary evidence in a timely fashion, and to the 
destruction of ‘a large number of documents’ before the start of the Inquiry (MacLean 
Report 2010: 651).  
 
 
Two of the cases examined by Judge Cory concerned Catholic 
solicitors, Rosemary Nelson and Pat Finucane. Rosemary Nelson 
represented the residents of Garvaghy Road, Portadown, who were trying to 
stop the Orange Order3 marching through their area from Drumcree Church. 4  
She also represented the Hamill family in proceedings arising from the killing 
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of Robert Hamill. Cory was in no doubt that, ‘it was the work of Rosemary 
Nelson as a solicitor which led to her murder’ (Cory Report 2004d: para. 4.10) 
and thus called for a public inquiry. The Government was implicated in 
collusion as the Northern Ireland Office had turned a blind eye to death 
threats against Nelson of which it was well aware (Cory Report 2004d: 4.241). 
The public inquiry (published May 2011) concluded that the Northern Ireland 
Office and RUC management were negligent in a number of respects and 
that overall ‘the state failed to take reasonable and proportionate steps to 
safeguard the life of Rosemary Nelson’ (Moreland Report 2011: 466). 
 
Pat Finucane represented a number of high profile republicans, 
including hunger striker Bobby Sands MP, and his clients were often told by 
RUC interrogators that their solicitor was targeted. Nelson and Finucane were 
not unusual in this respect. RUC threats against lawyers involved in criminal 
cases were common in the 1980s and 1990s. Some of these lawyers were 
apparently resented for being successful Catholics, were assumed to be 
‘fellow-travellers’ of their paramilitary clients and were subject to speculation 
that their high earnings from legal aid were financing terrorist causes (Murphy 
2000: 1889-91). Such stereotyping was famously reinforced by a Home Office 
Minister, Douglas Hogg, who told the House of Commons (17th January 1989) 
that ‘there are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly 
sympathetic to the cause of the IRA’, an opinion that could only have come 
from his earlier meeting with the RUC (Cumaraswamy 2009: 58). Finucane 
was shot dead while having Sunday lunch less than a month later (12th 
February, 1989). 
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Finucane was not only known within the RUC for ‘his pioneering efforts 
in bringing successful civil claims for assault and false imprisonment against 
the police’ (Moore 2009), but was also in the public eye for his legal 
successes in relation to one of the ‘shoot-to-kill’ cases (Treacy 2009). By the 
early 1980s, Finucane had become ‘a thorn in the side of those in the military 
and security establishment who had things to hide’ (Rolston 2000: 176).  
 
The issues surrounding the killing of Pat Finucane are constitutionally 
and legally so serious, and so contested, that they remain unresolved. 
According to one account,   
‘there is evidence that certain members of the British government knew 
exactly what was going on at that time in Northern Ireland because of the 
constant stream of totally reliable information forwarded to both the Joint 
Intelligence Committee and the Home Office by their officers working and 
serving in the intelligence agencies …’ (Davies 1999: 135). 
 
Judge Cory’s review of the Finucane case relied heavily on the work of John 
Stevens who carried out three inquiries over a fourteen-year period into 
allegations of collusion between various security forces and Loyalist armed 
groups, from the period 1987 to 1989. In 2003, an overview of Stevens’ 
findings to date was published which indicated that ‘some major lines of 
enquiry are still in the early stages of investigation’ (Stevens Report 2003: 3). 
Part of the Stevens Report describes a culture of obstruction ‘widespread 
within parts of the Army and the RUC’ which included setting fire to his 
incident room (2003: 13).5 Stevens concluded that ‘the murders of Patrick 
Finucane and Brian Adam Lambert could have been prevented’. He went on, 
‘I conclude there was collusion in both murders and the circumstances 
surrounding them… [ranging from]  the willful failure to keep records, the 
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absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, 
through to the extreme of agents being involved in murder’.    
 
It is clear from the evidence available to Cory that the Security Service was 
informed on at least three occasions by its sources that Loyalists planned to 
assassinate Finucane. Cory found evidence that ‘an officer of the joint 
Security Service/Secret Intelligence Service’ described the 1981 Special 
Branch decision not to alert Finucane as “courageous” (Cory Report 2004a: 
60-1). This was an indication that,  
‘both the Security Service and RUC SB saw agent security as taking 
precedence over the need to warn a targeted individual that his life was at 
risk’. (Cory Report 2004a: 62) 
 
On the basis of ‘strong evidence that collusive acts were committed by the 
Army (FRU), the RUC SB and the Security Service’, Cory was satisfied of the 
need for a public inquiry (Cory Report 2004a: 107). Following publication of 
the Cory Report, the Finucane family was told by the Blair Government that 
an inquiry must await new legislation – the Inquiries Act, 2005, which 
empowers Government Ministers to restrict attendance at an inquiry and the 
disclosure or publication of evidence (Section 19, Inquiries Act 2005). The 
family refused to participate in an inquiry convened under the Act, in the 
absence of assurances that an inquiry Chair would have full powers of 
independence and compulsion, following the model applied to the public 
inquiry into the death of Baha Mousa.6  In October 2011, the Finucane family 
were invited to Downing Street, expecting an Inquiry to be agreed on this 
basis. Instead, Prime Minister David Cameron told the family that the long-
standing commitment to a public inquiry was now withdrawn. His alternative 
was to appoint Sir Desmond de Silva QC to review all the papers relating to 
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the Finucane murder, a decision that the family is challenging through judicial 
review.  
 
 In 1994 Geraldine Finucane took the UK Government to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the grounds that there had been no 
proper, effective investigation into her husband’s death. The Court eventually 
found in her favour in 2003, a politically troublesome outcome given the large 
number of outstanding lethal force cases from Northern Ireland at that time 
(Ní Aoláin 2002). In particular, the ECtHR cases raised issues of the lack of 
independence in the investigation of deaths caused by police officers, the 
failure of the Director of Public Prosecutions to explain decisions whether to 
prosecute or not, and the failure of the inquest system to provide a prompt 
and effective remedy. While the ECtHR cases stimulated reform in these 
areas, the lethal force deaths ‘represent an enormous accountability gap for 
the State’ (Ní Aoláin 2002: 582).   
 
The ECtHR  judgements were undoubtedly a factor in the 2005 
decision to establish an Historical Enquiries Team (HET) within PSNI to 
review ‘unresolved’ killings arising from the conflict between 1968 and 1998. 
The police eventually agreed to review 3,268 cases, over 2,000 of which were 
regarded as unsolved murders (Lundy 2009). Some of these are ‘complex 
cases’ involving linked killings and collusion. The initiative has improved 
communication with the families of those killed, the majority of whom were 
never given any information about the death itself or any investigation that 
may have taken place (Consultative Group on the Past 2009: 107). There 
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remain different views as to whether HET investigations play a role in 
satisfying the requirements of Article 2 of ECHR or fall short of this standard.  
 
HET cases involving complaints against the police (over 120 thus far) 
are referred to the Office of the Police Ombudsman (OPONI) and the 
handling of these cases has proved particularly controversial, resulting 
ultimately in the resignation of the Police Ombudsman. The main problems 
have been ‘the length of time taken, the quality of the reports it (OPONI) has 
published, and the conclusions reached’ (Committee on the Administration of 
Justice 2011: 16). A Criminal Justice Inspection Report (2011: 34) concluded 
that ‘the flawed nature of the investigation process in historic cases, the 
divisions within senior management, and concerns around the handling of 
sensitive material have undermined confidence in the work of the OPONI 
among some staff and key stakeholders’. It recommended the suspension of 
all work on historical cases until an adequately resourced Directorate 
becomes fully operational.  
 
It is clear from the above that the intelligence-led policing practices 
which allowed people to commit murder with impunity remain a significant 
source of political contention. As such they present barriers to the building of 
confidence in the PSNI and the implementation of the policing principles 
articulated in the Agreement and the Patten Report: representative bodies 
serving communities by preventing crime and solving problems within a 
framework of accountability and human rights.  
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The Costs of Transition 
The piecemeal nature of the transitional processes reviewed above owes 
much to the lack of political agreement over the causes of the violent conflict 
and the reasons why it endured so long. While there is no ‘transitional justice 
budget’ as such, it is possible to identify most of the major costs of transitional 
processes (Table 1). It should be pointed out that Table 1 does not include 
the costs of the Stevens Enquiry (ongoing) or the twenty other major inquiries 
in Northern Ireland held since 1968, most of which have concerned the 
legitimacy of police, military and intelligence operations (Rolston and Scraton 
2005: 552). It also excludes the costs of implementing the Patten Report. 
Table 1 shows that over £440 million has been spent on recent transitional 
justice process in the North and €68 million in the South to date.  
 
Table 1: Identifiable costs of transitional justice processes 
Activity Budget 
(£ millions) 
Notes 
Northern Ireland 
Independent 
Monitoring 
Commission 
(Decommissioning) 
6.2 Source: Twenty-Sixth and Final Report 
of the Independent Monitoring 
Commission, 2004-2011 – Changes, 
Impact and Lessons.  
Bloomfield Report 18.3 Funding for victims’ groups 1998-2001. 
Source: Commons Hansard, 4 
February 2002, col. 652WA. 
Post-May 2007 victims 
funding 
36.0 Northern Ireland Assembly, 26 
February 2010, WA 208.  
Support for security 
forces 
13.3 Includes George Cross Foundation, 
Police Rehabilitation and Retraining 
Trust, Police widows’ fund 
Ex-prisoner support 
groups 
17.3 1999-2003. Source: House of Lords 
Hansard, 10 June 2004, col. 37WA. 
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The Bloody Sunday 
Inquiry 
192.0 Source 2. 
Robert Hamill Inquiry 33.0 Source 2. 
Billy Wright Inquiry 30.6 Source 2. 
Rosemary Nelson 
Inquiry 
46.5 Source 2. 
Pat Finucane Inquiry  Government will take account of 
potential duration and cost of an 
inquiry. Source: House of Lords 
Hansard, 15th June 2011, col. 198WA. 
De Silva Review not costed. 
Historical Enquiries 
Team 
34.0  
Police Ombudsman 
HET work 
4.3 Source 1. 
Retrospective Murder 
Investigation Unit 
7.5 Source 1. 
Consultative Group on 
the Past  
1.3 Source: Commons Hansard, Written 
Answers, 11 February 2009, col. 
2020W 
(Legacy Commission) (300.0) Proposed. Would absorb any future 
HET costs. 
Delayed Inquests 0.4 26 cases involving 36 deaths are 
subject to delayed inquests. The oldest 
case is from 1972, 3 are from the 
1980s, 15 from the 1990s, and 6 from 
the 2000s. Source 1. 
Independent 
Commission for the 
Location of Victims’ 
Remains 
 Costs shared on a North/South basis 
as they arise. 
Republic of Ireland                (Euros millions) 
Barron Inquiries 2.3 Dáil Eireann Debates, 26 October 
2005. 
Commission of Inquiry 
into Dublin and 
0.8 The Irish Independent, 28 August 
2006. 
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Monaghan Bombings 
Smithwick Tribunal 0.3 This concerned alleged Garda 
collusion in the killings of Breen and 
Buchanan.  Dáil Éireann, Written 
Answers, 16 February 2006. 
Morris Tribunal 58.0  
Remembrance Fund 6.2 Seanad Éireann Debates Vol.188, 20 
February 2008, col. 984. 
Source 1: Healing Through Remembering http://www.healingthroughremembering.org/ 
Source 2: Sear (2011). 
 
The muted arguments about the costs of inquiries North and South 
became louder as the Bloody Sunday costs increased. Indeed, it has been 
argued that this was the main factor behind the introduction of the new 
Inquiries Act (Robins 2010). When calling for an inquiry in the Finucane case, 
Judge Cory argued that Inquiries are ‘a small price to pay for a lasting peace’ 
(Cory Report 2004a: 111). As one Senior Counsel put it when discussing the 
Barron Report, 
‘How can one build peace if one does not know the truth about the past? […] 
How much money is there for making peace? There seems to be any amount 
of money for making war’. (Ó Dúlacháin 2004) 
 
 
Towards Representative Criminal Justice 
The Good Friday Agreement promised a ‘new beginning’ to policing and 
included terms of reference for the Patten Commission. One section of the 
Patten Report dealt with size, noting that the RUC had 13,000 uniformed 
officers and 3,000 civilian staff. According to the Home Office model, 
Northern Ireland should have 4,300 officers and 1,700 civilians (Patten 
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Report 1999: 75). The Patten plan was to reduce numbers to around 7,500 
full-time regular officers and 2,500 part-timers as a reserve.  
 
The community background of police officers was a major political 
concern as the Agreement aspired to a police service that was socially 
representative. Patten noted that the RUC was overwhelmingly Protestant 
and male. Only 8 per cent of full-time officers were Catholic overall, with a 
lower figure for the full-time Reserve. While the figure for women was slightly 
better at 12.6 per cent, a third of female officers were in the Part-Time 
Reserve. As regards civilian support staff, the picture was very different for 
women (66 per cent of the total) but not so different for Catholics (12 per cent 
of the total) (Patten Report 1999: 82, 85).  
 
 Patten proposed that the appointment of police officers should be 
made on a 50:50 Catholic/Protestant basis, for both civilian and uniformed 
personnel, drawn from a pool of recruits who had achieved a defined 
standard in the recruitment process. Anticipating that this would be opposed, 
Patten proposed that it should be temporary and subject to review after ten 
years. With 50:50 recruitment and other measures in place, the Patten Report 
predicted that Catholics would comprise between 28 and 33 per cent of the 
police service within ten years (Patten Report 1999: 83). No targets were set 
for the recruitment of women. 
 
The proportion of Catholic uniformed officers in the PSNI had reached 
30.3 per cent and the proportion of women, 26.6 per cent, by April 2011. The 
 17 
picture for civilian staff was not so close to the Patten target: 18.7 per cent 
were Catholic and 36 per cent male. The Government’s view is that ‘the PSNI 
is now broadly reflective of the community’ (Northern Ireland Office 2010a: 5) 
and thus feels that ‘the use of the provisions beyond March 2011 cannot be 
justified’ (Northern Ireland Office 2010a: 13).  
 
In Northern Ireland as a whole, Catholics make up 45.5 per cent of full-
time employees in the public sector (Equality Commission 2010). Of all 
monitored applicants in the workforce in 2009, Catholics made up 51 percent 
of the total. The figure for appointees was 50.9 per cent. The Catholic 
applicant figures for the PSNI are considerably below this and, for any 
specific recruitment campaign, reflect the political conditions pertaining at the 
time. There has been a five-fold increase in bombing incidents since 2006/07 
(Chief Constable 2011: 54) and groups opposed to the peace process have 
sought to deter Catholics from membership of the PSNI by attacking Catholic 
police officers.7  
 
In the last ten years there have been sixteen recruitment campaigns 
and more than 107,000 people have applied to join the police (Northern 
Ireland Office 2010a: 17). The proportion of Catholic applicants began to rise 
as political agreement on devolution progressed in 2006 and early 2007. The 
June 2007 recruitment attracted the highest proportion of Catholics ever (44.3 
per cent) but the figure has declined in each subsequent recruitment exercise 
(to 37.4, January 2010). In the absence of detailed monitoring data it is not 
possible to predict the impact of the withdrawal of 50:50 recruitment, but there 
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have been concerns that the proportion of Catholics qualifying for the merit 
pool is well below the proportion of Catholic applicants (Criminal Justice 
Inspection 2009: 35-36). After a perfunctory consultation, the Government 
allowed the 50:50 provision to lapse. 
 
The main downsizing target in the Patten Report of 7,500 full-time 
officers was met some time ago. Arguably, the police service remains 
disproportionately large relative to recorded crime, detection rates and 
comparisons with Britain. Policing Northern Ireland cost £1.2 billion in 
2010/11 for an overall recorded crime rate of 58 per 1,000 population, 
representing a cost of £41,300 for each crime detected. The average crime 
rate across Britain was 79 for 2009/10 (HC Debate, 527, col. 1105-6W).  
 
No Patten-style review of the prison system was built into the 
Agreement. All the focus was on the release of prisoners serving sentences 
for offences scheduled under Northern Ireland’s emergency powers. These 
were effectively superseded by the normalisation of anti-terrorist legislation in 
2000 as proposed in the Lloyd Report 1996 (Thomas 2003).  
 
The business of prisons in Northern Ireland has changed very little 
since the 1998 Agreement. Although there are now relatively few prisoners 
belonging to groups continuing to use violence, the Prison Service remains 
steeped in a legacy of conflict. With a total staff of 2,300 and a budget of 
£157 million, the cost per prisoner is £77,800 or £95,000 based on occupancy 
(Criminal Justice Inspection 2010: 5), almost the same as in 1993. In the 
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words of the Criminal Justice Inspection (2010: vii), the Prison Service ‘has 
remained largely untouched by the reforms of the criminal justice system’. But 
there has been growing pressure to reduce costs and to address the 
unrepresentative composition of the prison workforce. As of April 2010, only 
10 per cent of the 1,860 uniformed prison staff were from a Catholic 
background (Prison Service 2010). Female officers are 22 per cent of the 
total.   
 
In a damning review of the Prison Service, the Owers Report 
complained that  change is limited by ‘longstanding issues of culture, staffing 
and governance which have been managed round, rather than tackled head-
on’ (Owers Report 2011: 6). The Prison Officers’ Association is identified as 
resisting and delaying change at every opportunity, invoking frequent ‘work-
to-rule’ actions. Now justice is a devolved responsibility, the Report argues 
that transformational change needs to be driven by a cross-party commitment 
to use prisons expenditure effectively. The alternative is to raise ‘the 
possibility of a strengthened role for the private sector’ (Owers Report 2011: 
7). To date the prison reform issue attracting the most attention is the 
prospect of removing royal insignia and titles from the Prison Service. First 
Minister Peter Robinson has threatened to resign over the issue. 
 
The Agreement contained a commitment to a wide-ranging review of 
criminal justice including judicial appointments, the prosecution process, 
cross-border co-operation and the possibility of a Department of Justice 
(Criminal Justice Review Group 2000). This review was very much an in-
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house exercise as compared with the internationally high profile Patten 
review. It produced 294 recommendations, many of which modernised or 
endorsed current practices and arrangements, or recommended further 
discussion. All of this was framed within a conventional review of the extent of 
crime, fear of crime and surveys of public opinion on sentencing, young 
offenders, the police and willingness to report crime.  
 
The significant changes were structural rather than cultural, though 
there was an emphasis on human rights training, accountability and 
transparency. The Review supported restorative justice for juveniles and 
young adults, proposed the setting up of a judicial appointments commission, 
and recommended the establishment of a new prosecution service. It was 
proposed that the inside of courts should be free of any symbols, that the 
judicial oath should be neutralised and that the declaration of ‘God Save the 
Queen’ on entry to court of the judiciary should cease.  
 
 In terms of budget and personnel, the Court Service, the Youth Justice 
Agency and the Public Prosecution Service (established in 2006) are dwarfed 
by policing and prisons. For example, Northern Ireland spends 60 times as 
much on the police service as it does on the Youth Justice Agency (£20m). 
The Courts Service, which employs 770 people, has a budget of £55m. The 
new Public Prosecution Service is about 70 per cent the size of the Courts 
Service. Both the Courts Service and the Public Prosecution Service are 
much more representative of the labour market than the prison and police 
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services, with 38 and 50 per cent respectively of their employees drawn from 
the Catholic community.   
   
 
Conclusion 
This overview of change in Northern Ireland’s criminal justice 
institutions has focused both on the scale of the industry and the nature of the 
institutions. In characterising the ‘blank-cheque’ approach to security-based, 
counter-terrorist institutions in the past, many highly politicised issues arise 
regarding policing cultures and, importantly, the defence of past practices 
through strategies of denial, obsfucation and contestation by the agencies 
themselves, sometimes with and sometimes without government support 
from Britain or Ireland. The conflict itself generated many controversies over 
human rights standards and profound divisions over the very idea of justice. 
In some cases, fundamental constitutional issues about governance and the 
rule of law have arisen where it appears that strategies of informant and 
agent protection are more important than life protection, and where 
responsibility lies with the highest levels of government.   
 
 The legacy of conflict and associated repositories of power are, 
however, deeply embedded.  Change within the institutions of criminal justice 
has at times been accelerated by transitional processes, as in the case of 
inquiries into pre-1998 killings, ECHR Article 2 compliance and the 
development of a more appreciative approach to the relatives of those killed 
in the conflict. At other times those processes have revealed deep 
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institutional and political rigidities, especially in the area of prisons, record 
keeping and intelligence. Transitional mechanisms and events have arisen 
unpredictably and in a piecemeal fashion, driven by a combination of the 
politics of the devolution, the needs of victims and survivors, struggles for 
truth and justice, and state-managed reforms, such as policing. With no 
agreed meta-narrative to account for the conflict and its persistence, it is 
inevitable that the transformation of criminal justice is patchy, contested and 
characterised by stalled initiatives such as the call for a Legacy Commission 
made two years ago. Ultimately, transitional justice has benefited lawyers 
more than the communities most damaged by the conflict.  
 
 
While political energies have been focused on transition, and 
particularly the transformation of policing, the more routine business of 
criminal justice has been less of a democratic priority. As recorded crime falls, 
the Northern Ireland prison population rises back up to 80 per cent of wartime 
levels. The criminal justice industry as a whole though has contracted by 
about one-third in employment terms over the last decade and is now 8 per 
cent of total public spending on Northern Ireland. The criminal justice 
workforce is now more representative of the Catholic population even though 
the prison system remains unreconstructed and will need a radical 
programme of early retirement and recruitment to achieve a more 
representative workforce. The industry may contract further, particularly in the 
prison sector where the budget is heading for a 28 per cent cut in cash terms 
over the next three years, offset to an extent by the extra security-related 
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£245m allocation to PSNI over the next four years. Whether these overall 
budgetary pressures and the creation of the Department of Justice for 
Northern Ireland will invigorate public debate on the fundamental purpose and 
value of criminal justice remains to be seen.  
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Notes 
1  HC Debate (1992-3) 230, col. 483-550.  
2 Robert Hamill a Catholic construction worker, was attacked by a group of 
Protestants in Portadown town centre while walking home after a night out 
with two of his cousins. He died in hospital eleven days later. He was 
attacked in full view of four police officers, one of whom was a ‘very 
experienced’ Reserve Constable who allegedly colluded with one of the 
perpetrators in destroying evidence. 
3  The Orange Order, founded in 1796, exists to promote Protestantism and 
is closely linked to Unionist political parties seeking to maintain Northern 
Ireland’s position within the United Kingdom.  
 30 
                                                                                                                                                                         
4  The residents’ account of the Drumcree dispute is dedicated to Rosemary 
Nelson who was killed on 15th March 1999 by a bomb attached to her car 
(see Garvaghy Residents 1999). 
5 An alternative explanation for the fire is given in chapter 4 of Simpson 
(2010). Duplicity and deception: policing the twilight zone of the troubles. 
Dingle, Co. Kerry, Brandon. 
6 Baha Mousa was one of seven men detained by members of the British 
Army in Iraq in 2003. The men were handcuffed, subjected to hooding and 
kept in stress positions in extreme heat. They were repeatedly assaulted. 
Baha Mousa died after a violent assault and was found to have 93 external 
injuries (Gage Report 2011). 
7 Examples include the shooting of Peadar Heffron and the murders of 
Stephen Carroll and Ronan Kerr. 
